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Abstract
Travel demand emerges from individual decisions. These decisions,
depending on individual objectives, preferences, experiences and spatial
knowledge about travel, are both heterogeneous and evolutionary. Re-
search emerging from ﬁelds such as road pricing and ATIS requires travel
demand models that are able to consider travelers with distinct attributes
(value of time (VOT), willingness to pay, travel budgets, etc.) and behav-
ioral preferences (e.g. willingness to switch routes with potential savings)
in a diﬀerentiated market (by tolls and the level of service). Traditional
trip-based models have diﬃculty in dealing with the aforementioned het-
erogeneity and issues such as equity. Moreover, the role of spatial in-
formation, which has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on decision-making and travel
behavior, has not been fully addressed in existing models. To bridge the
gap, this paper proposes to explicitly model the formation and spread-
ing of spatial knowledge among travelers. An Agent-based Route Choice
(ARC) model was developed to track choices of each decision-maker on
a road network over time and map individual choices into macroscopic
ﬂow pattern. ARC has been applied on both SiouxFalls network and
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1Chicago sketch network. Comparison between ARC and existing models
(UE and SUE) on both networks shows ARC is valid and computationally
tractable. To be brief, this paper speciﬁcally focuses on the route choice
behavior, while the proposed model can be extended to other modules of
travel demand under an integrated framework.
Keywords: Agent-based model, route choice, traﬃc assignment, travel de-
mand modeling
1 Introduction
Travel demand emerges from individual decisions. Travelers make decisions ac-
cording to their individual objectives, preferences, experiences and knowledge
about travel. Furthermore, previous decisions provide travelers with unique
experience and spatial knowledge, thus inﬂuencing their subsequent decisions.
Therefore, travelers decisions are both heterogeneous and evolutionary (Levin-
son, 1995; Srinivasan and Mahmassani, 2003; McFadden, 2002; Yang and Huang,
2004). There has been long-established eﬀort both by practitioners and re-
searchers to bridge the gap by mapping individual travel decisions onto a macro-
scopic context. Because of the behavioral nature of travel decisions, it is widely
believed that travel demand models should treat individual traveler as the basic
units of analysis based on solid behavioral principals (Ramming, 2002; Balmer
et al., 2004; Zhang and Levinson, 2004; Zhang, 2006). Mainstream research
and practice, however, has treated trips as the units of analysis since the 1950s
due to the lack of deep understanding of the mechanisms of travel behavior and
limitation in data, computational power, and algorithms. By assuming homo-
geneity, these models simplify the object of study to analyze large networks.
Consequently, these models received great popularity in practice during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century and many algorithms and commercial software
2packages have been developed to implement these aggregate models.
However, this trip based modeling paradigm encounters great diﬃculty when
it tries to describe and evaluate some emerging initiatives to mitigate congestion
and pollution, such as toll roads and advanced traveler information systems. For
example, toll roads diﬀerentiate level of service on the supply side. As travelers
who have distinct attributes (value of time (VOT), willingness to pay, travel
budgets, etc.) and behavioral preferences (e.g. willingness to switch routes
with potential savings) adjust their travel decisions in a diﬀerentiated market,
the network can exhibit new traﬃc patterns, which will further aﬀect pric-
ing strategies and investment decisions. Traditional trip based models cannot
provide an accurate description of this complex mechanism, as they are inca-
pable of addressing important issues such as equity. Actually, many researchers
(Estache and Strong, 2000; Yang and Zhang, 2002; Santos and Rojey, 2004)
have emphasized the importance of equity as a consequence of road pricing and
pointed out equity is an individual, not a group, problem (Evans, 1992). To
account for this complexity, transportation economists and policy makers have
long advanced their focus from ﬁrst-best prices with homogeneous network as-
sumptions to second-best prices under heterogeneity in both network users and
service providers (Pigou, 1920; Knight, 1924; Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Vick-
rey, 1963; Button and Verhoef, 1998; Levinson, 2005; Zou and Levinson, 2006),
which requires explicitly modeling individual travelers route choice behavior.
Although some researchers have studied these problems on small networks, a
behavior-based model, which is not only suﬃciently accurate but also applicable
on large network, does not exist (Zhang, 2006).
It is crucial to recognize that travel decisions are based on travelers’ knowl-
edge about the network. Travelers, limited in their capability of acquiring, pro-
cessing and storing spatial knowledge, can only consider the routes they know.
3This is the very reason that engineers try to assist travelers to make decisions
by providing additional information about the network through technological
innovations such as ATIS. As indicated by Srinivasan and Mahmassani (2003),
ATIS cannot be well evaluated without explicitly accounting for the heterogene-
ity in behavior and the presence of dynamic learning and adjustment processes
in user behavior. Many other researchers (Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Zhang
et al., 2004) also emphasized the role of information and learning in traveler be-
havior such as route choice decisions. However, limited work has been done to
systematically model the mechanism of acquiring, processing, storing of spatial
knowledge and its communication among travelers.
To bridge the gap between the aforementioned demand and current practice
in modeling, this paper explicitly models the formation and spreading of spatial
knowledge (route information) among travelers and tracks the choices of each
decision-maker on a road network over time. Individual travelers are treated as
the unit of analysis and extending previous work (Zhang and Levinson, 2004),
an Agent-based Route Choice (ARC) model is built to map individual choices
into system ﬂow patterns. Given a set of system parameters, the modeled
road network can evolve a speciﬁc ﬂow pattern, replicating real-world network
changes. This agent-based approach, representing a signiﬁcant departure from
the previous literature that has primarily relied on equilibrium analysis, is also
applicable on large real-world transportation networks. The second section re-
views previous research, and introduces the new ARC model. Its properties
are discussed and application on the Chicago Sketch network is demonstrated.
Models such as ARC produce insights that may have signiﬁcant implications for
a more comprehensive agent-based travel demand model.
42 Literature Review
Route choice model maps travel demand (often deﬁned by an origin-destination
(OD) trip table) into a link ﬂow pattern, which is also known as a traﬃc as-
signment. Theoretical research in this ﬁeld has a long history. Varying in as-
sumptions of route choice behavior, many assignment models and corresponding
algorithms have been proposed. All-or-Nothing is a simple route choice model
that assumes travelers minimize some disutility (usually travel time) while ig-
noring what other travelers are doing. If we take other travelers into account,
this minimization assumption, known as Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle (Wardrop,
1952), leads to the User Equilibrium model. The original UE models assumed
perfect knowledge of the network by travelers and also assumed all travelers
were identical (homogeneous). To account for the heterogeneity problem, re-
searchers introduced the bi-criteria or multiclass assignment problem (Arnott
and Kraus, 1998; Yang and Huang, 2004), in which travelers are diﬀerentiated
into groups and characteristics such as VOT are identical within group and
diﬀerent between groups.
Other researchers tried to solve heterogeneity problem employing discrete
choice models. Introducing a random perception error in travel time and treat-
ing it with Multinomial Logit model, Daganzo and Sheﬃ (1977) proposed the
Stochastic User Equilibrium model. This model suﬀers from the so-called In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternative problem and many alternatives, including
Nested Logit, Probit and Logit Kernel model, have been proposed to miti-
gate this problem (Ramming, 2002). However, these models only model how
to choose route among alternatives but tell little about how to generate the
route choice set. To generate the route choice set, sometimes known as the
K-Shortest Path problem, several solutions based on Dijkstras algorithm (Zil-
iaskopoulos, 1994) have been introduced. Other heuristic approaches such as
5Link Elimination Approaches by Azevedo et al. (1993), Link Penalty Approaches
by De La Barra et al. (1993), and Branching approach by Bellman and Kalaba
(1960), have also been used. These approaches are also related to shortest path
algorithm and lack an explicit behavioral foundation.
As computer simulation becomes more and more common in transportation,
researchers are now able to model and simulate individuals traveling on large
networks. As a result, simulation models are increasingly common in the ﬁeld of
route choice study because of their capability of modeling and tracking behavior
of individual travelers over time. Mahmassani and Hawas (1998) developed DY-
NASmart, which simulates not only day-to-day but also on-road route choice
decisions. DYNASmart focuses more on modeling travelers choice given the
presence of additional information rather than how such information is gener-
ated. Agent-based modeling has received increasing emphasis in transportation
(Transportation Research Part C (2002 Volume: 10C 325-527) has dedicated
a special issue to this topic) because of its capability in modeling individual
components and their interactions in complex network. Following this modeling
strategy, Nagel and Barrett (1999); Nagel and Rickert (2001) proposed TRAN-
SIMS, assuming travelers take the shortest path constrained by activity choices
and generating ﬂow patterns through Cellular Automata simulation. Noticing
the limitation of the shortest path assumption, researchers (Balmer et al., 2004;
Charypar and Nagel, 2005; Balmer and Nagel, 2006) proposed Matsim as an
extension, in which choice sets are generated by randomly mutating routes and
then discarding unrealistic options (e.g. routes with unreasonably high cost or
using modes inconsistent with traveler characteristics). While this algorithm is
enlightening and capable of dealing with multi-modal cases, the route choice set
generation is ineﬃcient and unrealistic.
Though many heuristic algorithms of route choice set generation have been
6proposed, few questions have been asked about how spatial knowledge (specif-
ically route knowledge) is generated and spread among travelers. Studies in
behavioral geography (Golledge and R.J., 1997), including both place learn-
ing theories and developmental theories, may shed light on this issue. The
former hypothesized individuals learn and store routes as relationships of loca-
tions, while the latter argues route knowledge is acquired through experience
and stored hierarchically according to their importance (people are more likely
to know routes near their home, work place and frequently visited locations)
and salience (freeways are more easily memorized). In recognition of the large
amount of spatial information and numerous evidence of the distortion and in-
completeness of stored spatial knowledge, Wolpert (1952) argues that spatial
knowledge is boundedly rational rather than utility maximizing. Information-
processing theories of choices also suggests decision makers choice strategies are
simple, local and myopic when facing complex system (Olshavsky, 1979; Payne
and Johnson, 1993; de Palma et al., 1994). Moreover, Bandura (1977)’s learning
theory suggested that travelers can learn routes from each other through ob-
serving or communicating. And route learning could be trial-and-error, charac-
terized by evolutionary development of knowledge and adjustments in behavior
over time. A comprehensive review of spatial learning theory has been provided
by Zhang (2006).
3 Agent-Based Travel Demand Model
3.1 Model framework
As presented, spatial learning theory suggests 1) travelers learn routes through
experiencing and communicating with others, 2) spatial knowledge has hierar-
chy and can be communicated, and 3) travelers capability of processing spatial
7knowledge is bounded and a trial-and-error process may be involved. Based on
these assumptions, together with the assumptions of heterogeneous travelers,
this section introduces the Agent-based Route Choice (ARC) model.
ARC simulates spatial learning, tracks evolutionary route choices, and gener-
ates macroscopic ﬂow patterns, which may be used to evaluate policy initiatives
or used as input for a more comprehensive travel demand model. Travelers form
spatial information through traveling and experiencing, and then spread that
information on the network through communication. They also make decisions
about destinations, time schedule, mode and travel route, all of which comprise
the demand side of travel activities (in this paper, to avoid confounding factors,
all but route are taken as given). Nevertheless, these demands are constrained
by the supply: network capacity and tolls, which are also taken as given in
this paper. All the decision makers have their individual attributes, goals and
behavior rules, and will make individual decisions based on information gained
through exploring the network or social exchange of information. Integrated
with other agent-based models, including residential and job location choice,
land use, and infrastructure investment models, ARC could enable a wide spec-
trum of studies in transportation and land use related topics. The following
paragraphs describe the modeling framework in detail.
3.2 Agent
The model contains three types of interactive agents: travelers, nodes, and links,
all of which have their individual attributes, goals and rules.
Travelers are characterized by their willingness to pay (u), value of time (v)
and capability of getting information (s). Willingness to pay reﬂects how many
resources have been allocated to travel and thus determines how far a traveler
could travel. Individual value of time provides travelers impetus to choose routes
8with diﬀerent travel time and toll combinations. Travelers with a larger social
network and better information resources distinguish themselves in their ability
of getting information from their peers who have a less eﬀective social network
and less exposure to new information. Therefore, travelers learn information
about network through both experience and learning from other travelers and
choose routes based on the information acquired and individual characteristics.
Consistent with current practice in planning, there are two categories of
nodes: network vertices and centroids. While vertices represent starting and
ending point of links, centroids represent residential locations and workplaces.
Applying social learning theory, centroids are also where people interact with
each other and communicate spatial information. Therefore, centroids also stand
for the neighborhood where travel information is pooled and communicated.
For example, people can learn travel information from their colleagues at the
workplace or from neighbors meeting in a grocery store. Suggested by spatial
learning theory, traﬃc information can only be generated through experience.
However, information brought to centroids will be pooled and shared by all fre-
quent visitors (e.g. people live or work here). Limited by information processing
capability, only up to K shortest paths from every other node on the network to
the current node will be kept. This information is updated as new information
is available and fed back to subsequent visiting travelers.
Links represent directed roads and are labeled with the origin, destination,
capacity (C), free ﬂow travel time (to), and toll rate (p). Link travel time (t)
and generalized link cost (c) can be derived given the traﬃc ﬂow and link cost
function. The BPR function is employed in the model to map ﬂows to travel
time.
93.3 Rules
ARC simulates individual route choices and determines the ﬂow pattern on the
network subject to a given OD distribution.
The initial route choice can be either given or generated by a random-walk
route searching process at iteration 0. In the random walk scenario, travelers
set oﬀ from their origins and travel in a randomly chosen direction after arriving
at a node. However, directed cycles and u-turns are prevented. Once travelers
arrive at the destination, their travel routes become the initial travel route and
will be updated in subsequent iterations. The randomness of searching direction
and the large number of travelers will ensure the diversity of initial route choices,
which comprises the choice set on subsequent iterations.
On subsequent iterations, each traveler follows a ﬁxed route chosen at the
end of previous iteration. Once arriving at a destination centroid, travelers
will enrich the information set with their individual knowledge while beneﬁt-
ing from the pooled knowledge at the same time by exchanging both shortest
path and toll information with centroids. Those travelers will also bring that
updated information back to their origin and repeat the exchange process. The
information exchange mechanism is illustrated by the following graph.
As illustrated in Figure 1, suppose that the traveler originating at node 1 is
traveling from node 4 to node 5. His initial shortest path knowledge is 1-3-4-5.
Suppose the shortest path information stored at node 5 is 4-5, 3-5, 2-3-5 and
1-2-3-5, respectively from nodes 4, 3, 2 and 1. The comparison starts from the
node closest to the current node along the path chain in travelers memory and
repeats for each node on this chain until reaching the origin. After comparing
the path from node 3 to 5, the travelers path information is updated to 1-3-5
since the shortest path for this path segment proposed by the node is shorter
than that held by the traveler. Notice that this improvement has also changed
10the shortest path from node 1 to 5 in the travelers memory. Consequently, the
node will adopt the path from node 1 proposed by the traveler since 1-3-5 is
better than 1-2-3-5. The updated path from node 1 to 5 then becomes part of the
travelers shortest path information. This information exchange mechanism will
naturally mutate the path chain and generate the most eﬃcient route, sometimes
better than all known existing routes. Since nodes store K alternative paths,
nodes will insert the path proposed by the visitor in their information pool as
long as this path is better than the longest path stored. This information will
also be shared by those travelers visiting node 5 at subsequent steps.
After stopping at the destination node, travelers compare their travel route
determined at the end of previous iterations and shortest path learned during the
currently iteration. The path length is evaluated in dollar values by considering
their individual value of time and the toll charged by each link segment. Since
travelers have diﬀerent values of time, the cost of K alternatives should be
reevaluated and sorted for each traveler. If the path suggested by the destination
node is better than their current route, the travelers have a probability to switch
to the better route that iteration. In general,
P = f (s,b,T)




p = s(1 − e−γb)ifb > T
p=0otherwise
where:
b represents the potential beneﬁt by switching routes, which is deﬁned as
the time or money saving by choosing route proposed by the destination node
instead of sticking to the current route.
11T is the threshold of beneﬁt perception, which reﬂects both the incapability
to perceive small beneﬁt and the inertia for people to change route.
s denotes the probability of perceiving an existing better route in a given
day, and captures the diﬀerentiation in the eﬀectiveness of social networks.
γdeﬁnes the shape of the probability curve.
ARC simulates the day-to-day route choice behavior of travelers and this
probability curve must account for two factors: 1) the probability a traveler
perceives this better path once its information is available and 2) the probability
a traveler takes this path once it is learned. It should be noted that information
spreading costs time and not everyone learns it immediately. Travelers with
more eﬀective social networks are more likely to be exposed to such information
and thus have a higher probability of learning the better path. Once a new
road opens, it takes weeks or even months before the ﬂow reaches at a stable
level. Even when people learn a better alternative, route change involves a
certain switching cost preventing travelers from changing routes immediately.
Or travelers may just resist of changing because of inertia. Considering these
factors, this curve should increase as beneﬁts increase and reach some up limit
predicted by the probability to learn. Estimation of this curve through survey
or other psychological study will enhance the empirical foundation of the model.
Figure 2 illustrated the ﬂow chart of ARC. After travelers choose their routes
according to the aforementioned probability, link ﬂow and link travel time will be
updated. Consequently, the cost of all possible paths stored both at nodes and
travelers will be updated without changing the choice set. Then travelers will
follow their new route and repeat the described process until an equilibrium
pattern is reached (equilibrium is deﬁned here as link ﬂow variance smaller
than a pre-determined threshold ε, we arbitrarily choose ε = 5). Once this
equilibrium is reached, no traveler has the incentive to change the travel route
12according to their behavior rules and available information. Thus a link ﬂow
pattern would be reached and could be provided to other models under a more
comprehensive framework.
4 Numerical experiments
Numerical experiments are conducted on the Sioux Falls network, a widely-used
testing network for travel demand modeling. The Sioux Falls network contains
24 nodes and 76 links, and there are 336,400 daily trips according to Bar-Gera
(2001). The number of trips between OD pairs has been rounded to integers.
The value of time is an important characteristic of travelers and can be
derived from survey data. This study assumes that value of time follows a
normal distribution with a mean of 10$/hour and a standard error of 2$/hour.
We then generate our traveler agents by randomly assigning this characteristic
subject to the chosen distribution.
Travelers route choice decisions regarding beneﬁts generated from route
switching is the behavioral foundation of ARC. It is crucial to decide the overall
performance of our traﬃc assignment model. A route switching probability in-
sensitive to potential beneﬁts leads to premature convergence, which is far-from
user equilibrium and generates unrealistic ﬂow distribution among links. In this
case, the ﬁnal ﬂow pattern is primarily determined by the initial route choice
of travelers. However, an overly sensitive probability will lead travelers jump-
ing between alternative paths. This ﬂip-ﬂop phenomenon prevents the model
from approaching equilibrium and the ﬂow pattern is also unrealistic. A fea-
sible distribution of route choice should follow in between and can be derived
from survey or more ideally, from experiment conducted in the ﬁeld. After test-
ing diﬀerent parameter combination, we choose the values (γ = 1 , T = 0.1
and s = 0.¯ 3 uniform for all travelers) ensuring fast convergence and accuracy
13equivalent to UE assignments.
4.1 Comparison to UE and SUE assignments
UE assignment (Frank-Wolfe algorithm) and SUE assignment (Dial’s algorithm
with a θ of 1 and standard MSA) are common practices in transportation studies.
Despite starting from a diﬀerent modeling philosophy, ARC should be able
to generate results consistent with those classical assignment problems with
reasonable computing time to validate its applicability in practice. To make
these models comparable, we assume the tolls on all links equal zero, keeping
other attributes such as capacity and free ﬂow travel time the same as Bar-Gera’s
network (Bar-Gera, 2001). We also adopted BPR function as our ﬂow-cost
function. It takes 35 iterations for ARC to reach equilibrium when simulating
336,400 daily trips on Sioux Falls network. Three models have been coded in
Java and applied on an Apple PowerMac G5 2.7GHz.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 summarizes the diﬀerence in link ﬂow compared to the best-known
result proposed by Bar-Gera (according to UE principle) and corresponding
running time. This comparison indicates that the macroscopic link ﬂow pattern
emerging from the individual decision-making process modeled in this study is
very close to the UE link ﬂow pattern. Since both SUE and ARC assume the
existence of perception error and probability in route choice, it is not a surprise
to observe that ARC generates a ﬂow pattern very similar to that of SUE,
which further implies that our assumption in term of route switch probability
is reasonable. Therefore, if we incorporate tolls on links and assume static
condition, we could expect a link ﬂow pattern close to a UE or SUE assignment
based on generalized cost.
Although the running time of ARC looks much longer than that of UE and
14SUE, we must realize that ARC generates much more information at the expense
of running time. Actually, we could trace the route choices of individual traveler
over time and generate various statistics (e.g. average value of time) of users
at diﬀerent level (such as link, path, zone, and network), which enable study
of questions such as equity or market diﬀerentiation. Moreover, ARC is more
sensitive to the number of travelers than the scale of the network. Noting that
the real network contains many more nodes and links but slightly more trips
comparing to the simpliﬁed SiouxFalls network, ARC shows advantages when
applied in practice, which will be demonstrated in the following section.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
There are several variables in the model that may aﬀect the results. Sensitivity
tests are conducted on these variables: size of information set, sensitivity to
route switching, and perception threshold. These are discussed in turn for both
the Sioux Falls and Chicago networks.
The size of information sets kept on centroids, or the number of alternative
paths (K), reﬂects the diversity of path information available and the extent of
peoples information processing capability when making the route choice. Some
destinations, such as downtown transportation hubs, are able to provide more
choices than others because of their aﬄuence of information. They are also the
most frequently visited nodes. This model assumes a uniform size of choice set
through the whole network for simplicity and the network performance with
diﬀerent sizes is summarized in Table 2. A larger K means more alternatives
are available when making a route choice and consequently it results in an as-
signment more comparable to the UE assignment, with other factors controlled.
However, more alternatives may lead to more trial-and-error cycles and conse-
quently it may take more iterations to achieve the convergence. As illustrated
15by Table 2, the diﬀerence is less signiﬁcant when K is larger than 4. We may
conclude that four alternatives for each OD is a large enough choice set on the
Sioux Falls network. However, whether this conclusion still holds on a larger
network is still an open question and needs further tests.
[Table 2 about here]
The changing of route imposes some costs and thus travelers may ignore
those routes bringing trivial reduction in travel cost. This reluctance to switch
routes is captured by the perception threshold (T) in the model. Outcomes
under diﬀerent threshold choices are summarized in Table 3. A larger threshold
means travelers are more reluctant to switch route and the model will conse-
quently converge faster. However, since UE assignment assumes perfect travel
cost perception and absolute equilibrium, a larger threshold will also lead to a
more signiﬁcant deviation from UE assignments. Experiments reveal that link
ﬂows with a threshold larger than T = 0.2 are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than those
generated by UE assignment.
[Table 3 about here]
4.3 Demonstration on larger network
Although ARC tracks the decisions of individual traveler, it is still tractable on
large real network. A demonstration has been conducted on the Chicago Sketch
network (CHS), a fairly realistic yet aggregated representation of the Chicago
region developed by the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS). As an
agent-based model, ARC does not deal with fractional demand. Consequently,
the original OD table provided by Bar-Gera (2001) has been rounded. In this
study, ARC simulates decision-making process of 1.13 million traveler agents
on a network with 387 centroids, 933 nodes, and 2950 links. To evaluate the
emerging pattern predicted by ARC, the same OD has been assigned using
16Origin Based Algorithm (OBA) developed by Bar-Gera and Boyce (2003) and
this assignment is taken as the best known assignment according to Wardrop’s
principle. All of the three models, ARC, UE (Frank-Wolfe), and SUE (Dial’s
algorithm with a θ of 1 and MSA), have been coded in Java and run on the
same computer for 100 iterations each. The link ﬂow comparison is summarized
in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
As indicated in Table 4, ARC generates a ﬂow pattern with a smaller dis-
crepancy compared to the OBA assignment than the alternatives, while UE and
SUE have very similar results. Figure 4 and Figure 5 further illustrate that the
ﬂow on most links are very consistent with the best-known assignment generated
by OBA. This comparison suggests that ARC has very good performance on
large networks and this advantage is more signiﬁcant if we consider the details
ARC can provide and the solider behavior foundation. Figure 3 illustrates how
maximum link ﬂow diﬀerence between consecutive iterations, the convergence
criterion adopted in this research, evolves over time for three assignment algo-
rithms. Although the diﬀerence compared to the other two algorithm decreases
over iterations, ARC converges much faster at the ﬁrst few iterations and ex-
hibits more stable ﬂow pattern. This is partly due to the behavior assumptions
such as information spreading speed and inertia of changing route assumed in
ARC, which is more consistent with the real world. Table 5 shows the com-
parison in computational eﬃciency on diﬀerent networks. Although ARC still
costs more time compared to UE and SUE, the diﬀerence reduces rapidly as the
scale of network increases. However, we must indicate that this running time for
ARC is based on the simpliﬁcation of uniform traveler characteristics in order to
be comparable with UE or SUE. If we consider heterogeneity in travelers, each
iteration of ARC consumes 5.5 minutes and it takes 85 iterations to converge,
17according to a criterion that the maximum relative link ﬂow error between two
consecutive iterations should be less than 6 vehicles.
[Table 5 about here]
5 Application
The introduction of toll road and price setting is a comprehensively debated
topic. One concern about toll roads is the potential inequity. It is intuitive
to think that travelers with higher value of time would take toll roads, while
poorer travelers select roads without or with fewer tolls. While this is a common
argument when people discuss the toll road, the extent of the diﬀerentiation
on large networks is seldom studied. Because of its capacity to model each
individual traveler, ARC has advantages in revealing the relationship between
toll rates and traveler diﬀerentiation. This paper only illustrates this idea with
a simple network, containing only one OD and two alternative routes (A and B).
The demand is assumed 2000 veh/h and each alternative route has a capacity of
800 veh/h. We assume route B is toll free and travelers reactions with diﬀerent
toll rate on route A are studied.
[Table 6 about here]
As illustrated in Table 6, if we charge a higher toll rate on route A, travelers
exhibit more signiﬁcant diﬀerentiation: fewer travelers would take route A and
those users have a higher value of time. While route B is more congested and
serves those travelers with a lower value of time. The extent of diﬀerentiation
depends on the toll rate charged on route B and the distribution of value of
time among travelers.
186 Conclusion and Discussion
Starting from theory about how spatial knowledge is generated, reﬁned and
communicated among travelers, the Agent-based Route Choice (ARC) model
diﬀers from previous research by generating a route choice set using a behavioral
framework. Parameters describe how travelers perceive the available informa-
tion and make route choice decisions. Upon estimation and calibration of those
parameters, a fully behavior based traﬃc assignment model can be established.
ARC simulates how travelers make route choice decisions over time and how the
product of those individual decisions evolves into a static (and near-equilibrium)
pattern if network conditions hold constant. Numerical experiments suggest
that ARC is realistic, and also feasible even on large networks.
Compared to a traditional UE or SUE assignment, the advantage of ARC
relies on its ability to track evolutionary decisions made by heterogeneous trav-
elers, particularly on networks with diﬀerentiated levels of service provided by
tolls. It is highly likely that travelers with higher value of time will take those
paths with higher tolls but lower congestion level, while those less wealthy trav-
elers prefer free public routes. Therefore, this model permits the investigation
of issues involving traveler diﬀerentiation, such as equity, marketing and toll
and investment strategies.
Adopting the evolutionary modeling approach and focusing on behavioral
solidity, ARC can account for the presence of exogenous information or non-
static network condition, in which case the equilibrium modeling paradigm may
not apply, since no equilibrium exists in these cases.
More importantly, ARC provides a new modeling platform based on ac-
quisition and processing of spatial information, which is behaviorally sounder
than modeling based on shortest path searching. Following the same agent-
based modeling paradigm and focusing on the travel behavior, we could revisit
19the problems of travel demand modeling, including residential, job, and non-
work location choice, mode choice, activity generation, and departure time and
scheduling. Since we deal with individual travelers, the same traveler agent in
also these models can carry identical personal characteristics and preferences.
Thus, this modeling framework exhibits the potential to solve the travel demand
and routing problems consistently, which has long been proposed by researchers.
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Abs. Rela. Abs. Rela. Abs. Rela.
mean 11547 40 0.30% 1080 2.10% 1043 1.60%
maximum 15333 151 1% 251 7% 181 6.80%
running time < 2s < 2s 80s
Table 2: Comparison between link ﬂows on Sioux Falls Network
K Iterations Max link ﬂow error(veh) Mean link ﬂow error(veh)
1 64 7943 1598
2 82 1496 329
4 105 1212 252
6 124 1375 271
10 119 1202 268
Table 3: Network performance with diﬀerent perception thresholds
T Iterations Max link ﬂow error(veh) Mean link ﬂow error(veh)
0.1 105 1212 252
0.2 105 1225 261
0.5 75 1831 344




UE (FW) SUE ARC
Abs. Rela. Abs. Rela. Abs. Rela.
mean 2383 170 7% 170 7% 108 4.50%
maximum 22365 2906 13% 2906 13% 2967 13%
running time 702s 1038s 4012s
Table 5: Network Scale and Running Time Comparison
Links Centroids Nodes Trips Computing time (sec)
UE SUE ARC
SiouxFalls 76 24 24 336400 2 2 80
Chicago Sketch 2950 387 933 1133783 702 1038 4012
Ratio 38.8 16.1 38.9 3.36 351 519 50
25Table 6: Link ﬂows and Users average value of time with diﬀerent toll rate
Toll on A Overall value of time (vot) Route A Route B
($) Mean ($/h) Variance Flow vot in $ Flow vot in $
0 10 5 987 0.168 1013 0.171
0.15 10 5 980 0.168 1020 0.171
0.3 10 5 932 0.169 1068 0.17
0.5 10 5 786 0.175 1214 0.166
1 10 5 591 0.184 1409 0.163
2 10 5 321 0.229 1679 0.158
















Figure 1: Information Exchange Mechanism























New Link Flow according￿

























































































































Figure 5: Relative Error in Link Flow between ARC and OBA assignment on
CHS
31